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As one of the first books to examine the implications arising from China's
accession to the WTO, China and the World Trading System has made a serious
effort to provide balanced accounts. Its authors include professors of law and
economics, as well as civil servants from both national governments and
international organisations such as the WTO and the World Bank. Their
national origins are equally broad and include, in addition to China and
Australia, all of the "Quad" Members, ie the USA, the EU, Japan and Canada.
The topics discussed are very diverse. They range from the procedural aspects
of the accession to substantive issues; from the systemic concerns to the
sector-specific concerns; from the classical trade issues of tariff and non-tariff
measures to the non-traditional but equally important issues such as human
rights and competition; from highly theoretical discourses on the Marxist
theory of labour surplus to down-to-earth discussions on the opening up of
markets in service sectors such as professional services, distribution and log-
istics services, telecommunication services, and financial services. In terms
of both depth and breadth, this book sets some important new benchmarks.
The first article in the collection is written by Professor John Jackson.
Even though, as Professor Jackson points out at the beginning of his piece, he
does not purport to write as an expert on China, the "Father of WTO" has
again shown his acumen by pointing out the six major aspects one has to
consider when discussing the impacts of China's accession to the WTO. This
provides the perfect roadmap for the discussions appearing in the other
articles that ensue. The reviewer has therefore chosen to concentrate on these
six facets for review. Being scrupulous in academic scholarship, Professor
Jackson has intentionally avoided rushing to conclusions on any issues. This
is entirely understandable as he presented the paper included in the book at a
conference held eight months before China finally acceded to the WTO.
With more than four years having passed since China's accession, it now seems
to be the perfect moment to further explore some of the issues identified by
Professor Jackson.
The first issue raised is the impact of the accession process. The detailed
history of the process has been well covered by two later contributions in the
same volume. One piece was written by the late Jeffrey Gertler, who, as the
secretary to China's Working Party under both the GATT and WTO, is bet-
ter positioned than anyone else to tell the story. The other piece was written
by Graeme Thomson, who, being the former chief negotiator for Australia
during China's accession, is also well qualified. Commenting on the most
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important bilateral negotiation during the Chinese accession process, Profes-
sor Jackson quotes one observer close to Washington as describing the Chinese
accession as a "wonderful success" in which the USA "demanded a lot and
gave up nothing." Looking at this from a broader perspective, however, the
reviewer is not so sure as to whether this was indeed a success or more of a
failure. It has now become all too self-evident that it is in the interests of
most, if not all, participants of the multilateral trading system to ensure a
rule-oriented rather than power-oriented system. To the reviewer's mind this
is a much better formulation of the concept of constitutionalisation, which is
the subject of extensive discussion in the chapter by Deborah Cass. Even
though, to some extent, the reviewer agrees with Cass that having China in the
WTO strengthens the constitutionalisation from both the institutional and
metaphysical perspectives, the reviewer would argue that the accession process
per se has, paradoxically, weakened the constitutionalisation because it has
failed to deliver the much-needed rule-orientation. Indeed, to many observers,
especially those based in China, the WTO Members, especially the major
Western countries, has exploited the eagerness of China to enter the WTO
to a scandalous level. In some of the recent discussions in China, the WTO
accession package has been compared to the "unequal treaties" forced upon
China by the Western colonial powers during the late nineteen century, with
Long Yongtu, the former Chief Negotiator for China during accession talks,
being labelled a traitor. Even though, as Gertler argues, many would regard
the Chinese accession as belonging to a class of its own and thus hardly rep-
licable, the downgrading of China to a second-class citizen to be bound by
many terms virtually unheard of in the WTO contributes to the degradation
of the WTO itself. The reason is very simple: once WTO members realised
they could extract a pound of flesh even from such a powerful country as
China, it would become natural for them to attempt to try the same on other
applicants. If pushed to the extreme, the price of accession could rise to such
a prohibitive level that no new member could, or would want to, come in.
While most of the recent accessions after China have been quite smooth, two
of them, namely that of Russia and Vietnam, seem to confirm the concern.
Vietnam's accession has taken 11 years, while that of Russia is now at its
thirteenth year - soon to challenge the 15-year record set by China. Second,
by manipulating, and sometimes even breaking, the WTO rules during the
Chinese accession, the Western powers have set a bad example for China.
How can they expect China to respect those very rules that they themselves
have not complied with? So far, China has generally lived with the WTO
rules, including even the discriminatory terms in its accession package. There
is no guarantee that this will always be the case, however. Indeed, the reviewer
would argue that this is simply because China has been slow to become familiar
with the general rules of the WTO, not to mention the complicated accession
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terms. Once China starts to realise that neither the WTO rules nor its acces-
sion terms are set in stone and could be subject to different interpretations,
the other WTO Members will regret their imprudence in having succumbed
to their short-term interests at the expenses of their long-term ones.
The second issue is the relationship between the special rules in the pro-
tocol and the general rules in the WTO Agreements. Many observers,
including the current WTO Director General,' have conceded that many of
the China-specific provisions in China's accession package, such as the non-
market economy status in anti-dumping investigations, alternative benchmark
methodology in subsidy-countervailing investigations, as well as the transi-
tional product specific safeguard mechanism and the special textile mechanism,
are discriminatory in nature and violate fundamental WTO principles such
as MFN. These China-specific provisions raise some really difficult legal ques-
tions. First, what is their status in the WTO legal system? The legal validity of
some of the provisions seems to be rather questionable. Taking the special
textile safeguard measure as an example, China is required to consult with
the Member invoking the clause to limit its own exports. This is the very
kind of measure that has been explicitly prohibited under Article 11(b) of
the Safeguards Agreement, ie, grey area measures which include voluntary
export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or other similar measures.
One might argue that the prohibition here does not apply to the Chinese
Accession Protocol because Article 11(c) states that the entire Safeguards
Agreement does not apply to "measures sought, taken or maintained ...
pursuant to protocols ... concluded within the framework of GATT 1994."
The reviewer would point out, however, that the Chinese Accession Proto-
col, legally speaking, is not concluded "within the framework of GATT 1994"
as the old Accession Clause under the GATT - Article XXXIII - has been
replaced by Article XII of the Marrakech Agreement. Thus, it is a protocol
concluded within the framework of the Marrakech Agreement, and, as such,
does not fall under the carve-out of Article 11(c). Second, many of these
provisions are ambiguous and nobody is quite sure as to exactly how they
work. This is illustrated by the recent spat between the Chinese and US gov-
ernments as to whether the USA has properly satisfied the requirements under
paragraph 242 of the Working Party Report before applying special textile
safeguard measures against Chinese textile products. In this regard, the con-
tribution by Michael Lennard is particularly useful. Using the provision
on price comparability in anti-dumping cases as an example, he illustrates
which of the many general principles of treaty interpretation under public
international law might be useful and how they should be applied in this
Of course, Pascal Lamy did not make this comment after he became the WTO chief. He made
this point at a lecture he gave in Hong Kong while being the Commissioner for Trade for the EU in
early 2004.
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context. After extensive discussions, he concludes that the investigating autho-
rities of the importing country must apply an objective standard in determining
the appropriate price of the like product. Even though the reviewer has doubts
about how "objective" such standard could be under the context of the broad
deferential languages of section 15 (a) of the Accession Protocol and Article
17.6 of the Anti-dumping Agreement, this analytical approach would pro-
vide useful guidelines for such cases in the future.
The third issue is China's implementation of the WTO obligations. There
are many potential problems, some legal, some political and at both the macro-
and micro-economic levels. One obvious legal problem is the status of inter-
national treaties in the Chinese legal system and whether such treaties could
be directly applied through domestic measures. Qingjiang Kong considers the
problem and suggests that fundamental questions still remain about China's
ability to implement and enforce WTO agreements. Another problem is that
China is a huge country and there are many differences in the various regions
across China. Ravi Kewalram considers this problem and argues that, in imple-
menting its WTO obligations, China must remove the inconsistent measures
at both the central and sub-national government levels. From a macro-
economic level, Ligang Song argues that the implementation requires major
structural overhaul. He discusses what has been achieved and what remains
to be done in carrying out structural changes, as well as how such changes
might affect the state of the Chinese economy. In order to carry out those
structural changes, China also needs to reform its trade policy. In their co-
authored paper, Elena lanchovichina and Will Martin discuss the implications
of the reforms that have been completed and identify what further reforms
are required. Other contributors discuss the problems and prospects of China's
implementation of its commitments under individual WTO agreements and
specific sectors. Amongst them are Ian Dickson, Ichiro Araki, Christopher
Arup, Dene Yeaman, Ian Macintosh, Richard Wu, Angela Gregory, Antony
Taubman, Daniel Stewart and Brett Williams. The post-accession experience
so far has shown that China has been quite willing, sometimes even eager, to
implement its obligations. For example, one of the major concerns during the
accession process was whether China could provide independent judicial
review of trade-related administrative decisions. In August 2002, the Supreme
People's Court issued "Rules on Several Issues in Trying Administrative Cases
on International Trade," which provide detailed guidelines on dealing with
trade cases according to China's WTO obligations. Overall, the Chinese gov-
ernment, especially the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), has implemented
the commitments according to the timeframe set out in the schedule. Some
of the commitments, such as the opening up of trading rights, as well as some
market opening measures in banking, insurance and tourism services, have
even been implemented ahead of schedule. One might wonder the reason
behind the smooth implementation. A possible explanation is that this reflects
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the power struggle between the many government agencies, with the
MOFCOM trying to weaken the powers of its rival ministries by taking away
some of their powers in certain sectors.
The fourth issue is the effect on the WTO dispute settlement system. Whilst
many observers worry about the emergence of a "case flood" against China
after its accession, Professor Jackson doubts that is going to happen because it
would be hard to establish violation complaints giving the fluid nature of the
transition clauses. The observation is shared by Silvia Ostry, who provides a
more practical explanation in her contribution: the foreign firms would decline
to make formal complaints for fear of retaliation by the Chinese government.
In her view, this would lead to a two-track trading system in which all other
WTO Members will be subject to transparent dispute settlement rules while
China would have some opaque tailor-made bilateral arrangements. During
the four years since China became a WTO Member, it has been involved as a
party in only two cases: once a complainant suing the USA, and in the other
case as a respondent being sued by the USA.2 China won the first case at both
the panel and Appellate Body levels and settled the second case with the
USA through consultations. These two cases, especially the second case,
illustrate another reason that is probably more important in explaining
the lack of formal legal disputes: the reluctance of the Chinese government,
especially the senior leadership, to engage in WTO dispute settlements. Ac-
cording to the Confucianism philosophy which is deeply rooted in the Chinese
society, litigation causes irreparable harm to the normal relationships and
should be pursued only as a last resort, or, better still, as the great philosopher
himself would have preferred, avoided.' To a large extent, the Chinese lead-
ership still cannot disentangle the legal issues from political and diplomatic
concerns and views the initiation of legal disputes in the WTO as synonym-
ous with the break-up of the diplomatic relationship with the other coun-
tries. In an article written by the reviewer last year, it was argued that China
should embrace the "Aggressive Legalism" strategy to use the substantive rules
of the WTO to counter what it deems to be the unreasonable acts, requests
and practices of its major trading partners.'
As was stated in that article:
2 On 30 March, the US and EU filed a third case against China on tax treatments for imported auto
parts. It was unclear, at the time this review was written, however, how China would respond to the
complaint.
3 James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Volume One: Confucian Analects, Book XII; Yan Yuan, Chapter
XIII, "The Master said, 'In hearing litigations, I am like any other body. What is necessary, however,
is to cause the people to have no litigations."' The full text is available at http://www.gutenberg.org/
dirs/etext03/cnfnll0u.txt (last checked on 29 Mar 2006).
4 Henry Gao, "Aggressive Legalism: The East Asian Experience and Lessons for China", in Henry Gao
and Donald Lewis (eds), China's Participation in the WTO, (London: Cameron May Publishers, 2005),
at pp 315-351.
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"the active use of the WTO dispute settlement system is not in conflict
with China's policy of peaceful development; instead, it should be an
integral part of this policy. [The major advantage of aggressive legalism is
that it turns cross-border disputes from a difficult political, trade or diplo-
matic issue that might undermine the bilateral relationships of the countries
involved into a legal issue that is embroiled in an intricate legal game.
Instead of a sensitive issue that can be easily polarized by the popular press,
the question now has become a highly technical legal game that is beyond
the grasp of the lay people. If the Member wins the case, it was all because
the politicians have worked hard to achieve 'real results'; if the Member
loses the case, the lawyers, or more frequently, the 'incompetent judges in
Geneva' will become easy scapegoats."
From some of the reviewer's recent interactions with the officials of MOFCOM,
especially the junior and middle-level technocrats from the WTO Division
and the Treaty and Law Division, it would seem there is a policy shift towards
more active participation in WTO dispute settlement mechanisms. One can
trace this to as far back as August 2003, when China started to participate in
almost all WTO cases as a third party. More recently, even the top leadership
seems to endorse the policy shift. This is well illustrated by the recent contro-
versy over the EU's anti-dumping action against imported Chinese shoes,
in which some top Chinese officials have reportedly threatened to bring a
complaint to the WTO. This is in sharp contrast to the 2004 dispute on the
Chinese export quota on coke, in which China gave in to the threats of the
EU to pursue the case at WTO notwithstanding the fact that China had a
perfect case from both legal and moral points of view.'
The fifth issue concerns China as a diplomatic leader in the WTO.
Recognising that "[iut is really asking for trouble to try to predict [China's]
role exactly," Professor Jackson does not provide any definitive answers. In-
deed, even today, four years after China's accession, we still get mixed signals
from both directions. On the one hand, China is a power which no WTO
Member can afford to ignore. It has continuously affirmed that its interest is
aligned with that of developing countries and has been a core member of the
major developing country grouping, G20, since its inception in 2003. In his
speech at the High-Level Meeting on Financing for Development at the
United Nations Summit on 14 September 2005, President Hu Jintao an-
nounced an ambitious foreign aid program. This included: zero tariff treatment
to certain products from all the 39 Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
having diplomatic relations with China, covering most of the China-bound
exports from these countries; forgiveness of the loans owed by the Heavily
5 For a detailed analysis of this case, see n 3, pp 334-348.
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Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) and LDCs to China; US$10 billion in
concessional loans and preferential export buyer's credit to developing coun-
tries to improve their infrastructure and promote mutual cooperation; medical
assistance to developing countries, especially African countries; and training
of professionals for developing countries within the next three years.' All
these seem to indicate that China wants to take on the role as a leader among
developing countries. On the other hand, China has consistently taken a low
profile in all WTO activities. Be it in the informal green room meetings, the
formal meetings of the various committees and councils or the grand sessions
of the Ministerial Conferences, China has generally been reticent. So far
China has only been vocal on two matters: the annual transitional review
and the title of the Taiwan delegation. As to the former, it is China's own
show and China must be more active in providing sufficient answers to the
questions from other WTO Members. As to the latter, even though Chinese
Taipei is, legally speaking, a separate Member in the WTO, China has consis-
tently claimed Taiwan to be one of its separate custom territories and asked
Taiwan to behave accordingly. After Taiwan's accession to the WTO, Taiwan
established a "Permanent Mission to the WTO" and appointed officials such
as Permanent Representative, Minister, Counsellor, First Secretary, Second
Secretary and Third Secretary to the mission. China, however, deemed such
titles to have sovereign connotations and asked the WTO Secretariat in early
2003 to re-title the Taiwan mission to the same "Economic and Trade Office"
as Hong Kong and Macau and remove the references to the diplomatic titles
of the Taiwan officials from the WTO Directory. Normally the WTO Secre-
tariat would update its directory twice a year: once in April, and again in
October. Due to the unbridgeable differences between China and Taiwan,
however, the directory was not updated since October 2002. Finally, in June
2005, two months before the expiration of the term of office for the outgoing
Director General Dr Supachai, a compromise was reached and the directory
was updated. In the new directory, Taiwan kept the name of its office as "Per-
manent Mission" and the official title of its Permanent Representative, but
formal diplomatic titles of other officials have been removed. Supachai also
includes a "Special Note by the Director General," in which he points out
that the directory is only for the internal use by the WTO Secretariat and its
Members, and does not affect the legal rights and obligations of any delega-
tion in any way. Also, citing Article XII of the Marrakech Agreement,
Supachai recalls that separate custom territories which are not sovereign states
can also become WTO Members, thus the title of the delegation of such
separate customs territories does not create any implications of sovereign rights.
Even though China is now the third largest trading power in the world
and is fast approaching second and first place, the reviewer would argue, con-
6 For the text of the speech, see http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/shnh60/t212916.htm.
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trary to the popular rhetoric made by some scholars, that it would not be good
policy for China to claim the leadership role within the WTO for the follow-
ing reasons. Firstly, the reviewer questions whether it is in the interest of
China to be the leader. As a newly-acceded Member, China is required to
undertake a lot of commitments, many of which are higher than those of
existing WTO members. It is already a humongous challenge for China to try
to implement these commitments. After having been in the spotlight for 15
years, what China needs now is some quiet breathing space. Shouldering the
leadership role would put China back on the front stage again and encourage
other Members to pressure China to make more concessions. Secondly, even
if assuming, arguendo, it is in the interest of China to be the leader, does
China have the experience and expertise to lead the crowd? Unlike other
developing country leaders such as India and Brazil, China's experience in
the multilateral trading system, even including that of the accession process,
is still rather limited. This may seem to have changed after the 1990s, when
the number of books published in China on WTO issues probably outnum-
bered those of all other countries combined together. This is just a false
prosperity, however, as most of the books are just introductory in nature and
lack substance. The number of people appointed as WTO panellists and Ap-
pellate Body members can also be used as an indicator to gauge the level of a
country's familiarity with WTO rules. Excluding those from Hong Kong,
Macau and Taiwan, so far no Chinese national has been appointed as panellist,I
not to mention Appellate Body member. At the same time, countries such as
India, Brazil, Egypt, Uruguay, the Philippines and Korea have produced many
panellists or even Appellate Body Members. Third, even if assuming, arguendo,
that China does have the leadership quality, would the other developing coun-
tries be content to have China assume the leadership role? The reviewer does
not have a crystal ball to predict the future, but history might offer some
valuable lessons here. During China's WTO accession negotiation, the WTO
Member that held on to the last moment before signing a bilateral agreement
was a developing country. Similarly, in anticipation of the expiration of the
WTO Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC), textile producer groups
from many developing countries signed the Istanbul Declaration Regarding
Fair Trade in Textiles and Clothing in March 2004 to request the WTO to
extend the ATC for another three years, presumably to fend off the threats of
the competition from Chinese textile producers.' Thus, if history can be of
any guidance, it seems doubtful that developing Members would readily allow
China to take on the leadership role. This is entirely understandable. With
most of its exports concentrated in labour-intensive or resource-intensive
7 Even though China nominated in February 2004 three individuals to the WTO indicative list for
Panelists, none of them have been appointed as panelists in any WTO cases yet. See Henry Gao, Can
Chinese Experts Become WTO "Judges"? Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly, May, 2004, pp 49-52.
8 For the text of the Istanbul Declaration, see http://www.fairtextiletrade.org/istanbul/declaration.html.
Vol 36 Part 1I China and the World Trading System 227
HeinOnline -- 36 Hong Kong L.J. 227 2006
products, China would compete with rather than complement the industrial
structure of other developing countries. It is no wonder that other developing
countries view China as a competitor rather than a friend. Indeed, notwith-
standing that the Chinese government has repeatedly held that China is, and
always will be, a developing country, and in spite of the fact that the per
capita GDP in China is comparable to that of many LDCs, China is also the
third largest trading power in the world and the only one among all develop-
ing countries to be among the top five traders worldwide. Thus, on many
issues, China's interest is actually closer to that of major developed countries
than that of developing countries. Agriculture is one such example: as China
imports a large quantity of agricultural products, it is actually not in China's
interests to follow the position of most developing countries and demand the
elimination of export subsidies. Trade facilitation, one of the four "Singapore
Issues," is another such example: as China exports a lot, it is actually in the
interest of China to push for the inclusion of trade facilitation in the WTO
framework to make the customs process more efficient and cheaper.
The sixth issue is China's role in addressing WTO institutional reforms.
Professor Jackson suggests that China might play a role in addressing some of
the deficiencies in the multilateral trading system. Ostry holds the same view.
So far, however, China has not been very active in discussions on WTO re-
forms. Instead, like many developing countries, China has been very reluctant
to engage in such efforts. The reasons mentioned in the last paragraph might
provide some explanation. It may be that China has just been too busy mind-
ing its own business, implementation of its accession obligations, to spare
time to deal with the broader issues of institutional reform. Also, the lack of
expertise in WTO matters means that even if China wants to participate in
such negotiations, it does not have the necessary capacity. Another problem
relates to the way China conducts its diplomacy. For many reasons, the Chi-
nese government keeps a tight control over diplomatic matters. Very often,
the diplomats in Geneva are not authorised to make decisions on many
issues, even those of relatively minor importance. Instead, all they can do is
to listen to the statements of other Members, read a pre-drafted statement
that has been approved by Beijing, and report the latest developments back
to capital. Frequently, it takes weeks before they get the orders back from
Beijing directing them to the politically correct course of action, but new
developments probably would have emerged in the interim, and they have to
start another exchange again.
Henry Gao*
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